SMU Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 3 Survey of Southwestern Law for 1950

Article 8

January 1951

Labor Law
Alben Edward Carpens

Recommended Citation
Alben Edward Carpens, Labor Law, 5 SW L.J. 309 (1951)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol5/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

1951]

SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1950

309

LABOR LAW
PEACEFUL PICKETING BY STRANGERS

Arkansas. In Local No. 802 v. Asimos' the Arkansas Supreme
Court discussed the right of a union to picket in the absence of
a labor dispute. A suit was brought to enjoin picketing petitioners'
restaurant. Petitioners had refused to sign a contract with defendant union as bargaining agent for the employees. No
outstanding contract had been in effect; only one employee was
a union member in good standing, and few of the other 23
employees had any desire to make the union their bargaining
agent. The union had voted a strike and had established a picket
line in order to enforce collective bargaining.
Picketing was peaceful and orderly, with the exception of one
questionable incident. Two pickets, each carrying a placard
reading "Jefferson Coffee Shop Refuses to Bargain with Employees' Local 802," slowly walked in front of the doors of the
coffee shop. As a result, the volume of business materially decreased, the proprietors suffered financial loss, and three or four
employees left work, either because frightened by assembled
crowds or because they had relatives in the union and were
reluctant to cross the picket line.
The trial court granted a permanent injunction against all
picketing. Upon appeal, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed and dissolved for the most part the injunction granted.
The court reasoned that peaceful picketing accompanied by a
lawful purpose, even in the absence of a labor dispute, involved:
freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The premises for the court's conclusion were as follows:
1. An isolated act of violence not connected with picketijg,"
was not sufficient to justify a permanent injunction.2
2. There had been no showing that the union had as its bb'
227 S. W. 2d 154 (1950).
---------...........-Ark
Local Union 858 v. Jiannas, 211 Ark. 352, 200 S. W. 2d 763 (1947); Rigg6 V.
Tucker Duck and Rubber Co., 196 Ark. 571, 119 S. W. 2d 507 (1938); Local Union
No. 313 v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450 (1918). The court also cited Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 -U. S. 287 (1941)..
2
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jective the execution of a closed shop contract prohibited by
statute.
3. The Arkansas court felt bound to abide by two United
States Supreme Court decisions in which no "labor dispute" had
been involved: the "Bakery Case" 3 , where a union picketed a
bakery to compel bakery peddlers to comply with union terms,
even though none of the peddlers were union members; and the
"Cafeteria Case"' where, in order to organize workers, a union
picketed a cafeteria run entirely by proprietors without any hired
help. Picketing in these two cases was held to be no great evil,
and so the Arkansas court reasoned that there was no fact present
in the Asimos case to permit a different result.
4. The United States Supreme Court was the final arbiter
as to the scope of the constitutional guaranty of free speech
attached to peaceful picketing.
The Asimos case indicates that the Arkansas court believes it
is compelled to dissolve an injunction in a picketing without
strike case in almost any kind of labor controversy, and this
seems to be the meaning of the Swing decision.' One may
question whether this is a desirable state of affairs. How can one
reconcile the absolute right peacefully to picket where an innocent proprietor is subjected to financial loss and impairment
f his good will because he refuses to contract with a union
-which does not represent his employees, and where employees,
in order to keep out of trouble, sustain a loss of pay? Why
.should picketing be allowed by a strange entity which has as its
purpose the organization of employees, and for which organiza,tion the employees have no desire? Such picketing becomes a
-weapon of oppression. One may wonder whether the United
States Supreme Court will reconsider and permit a state to decide
that the interests of the community require that "stranger"
picketing be prohibited.
There was a question of misrepresentation in the Asimos case.
The picketers were carrying a placard worded "Jefferson Coffee
3

Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942).

4 Cafeteria Employees' Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
:5American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
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Shop Refuses to Bargain with Employees' Local 802". A reasonable implication was that the owners refused to bargain with the
chosen representative of the majority, if not all, of the employees
working in the coffee shop. Yet the Arkansas court merely stated
that the signs carried by the pickets were not libelous or false.
The fact was that one employee out of 24 was a union member.
Granting that the peaceful picketing could not be enjoined, it
is suggested that a requirement of a fuller and more accurate
placard would have been fair. Thus, the placard might have been
made to read:
One employee belongs to our union. Jefferson Coffee Shop
refuses to bargain with Local 802."
By this method, freedom of speech is still permitted, but the harm
done to innocent proprietors and idle employees is greatly decreased, and the public is correctly informed.
PEACEFUL PICKETING FOR AN ILLEGAL PURPOSE

Arkansas. Self v. Taylor' involved a suit by an employer to
enjoin the representative of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.), Local No. 700, and others from
picketing his business. Over a course of nine years, the union had
been the bargaining representative for the employees. A one-year
closed shop agreement with an automatic renewal clause had
been in effect since 1946 but was terminated by the union in
1949. In 1947 the State of Arkansas had passed a law which prohibited closed shop contracts, and it applied to all collective contracts executed subsequent to the passage of the Act. 7
After termination of the contract, all employees quit work. For
several months negotiations were in progress between the employer
and the union representative, and unsuccessful attempts were made
by the union to impose another closed shop contract. Finally, the
union offered a contract with no mention of closed shop, union
shop, or union hiring hall, but included therein was a provision
for cancellation at any time by either party upon 60 days' notice.
6 -----------Ark-------------235 S. W .2d 45 (1950).

TARK. CONST. AMEND. No. 34 (1945) ; ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN.

§§

81-202, 81-203.
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The employer agreed to accept all terms of the contract if it were
on a year's basis, but declined to sign it in its presented state because he had been told by union officials that he would have to discharge non-union employees or the union would exercise its right
to cancel. After continued insistence on the clause by the union,
the employer broke off negotiations.
Soon after, two union members began peacefully picketing
the place of business. They carried a placard with the words,
"This Place is Unfair to Electrical Workers Local A.F.L. 700."
To restrain such picketing, the employer filed a petition for
relief, and the trial court granted a permanent injunction on the
ground that the union was picketing to obtain a closed shop.
Upon appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the evidence
sustained the finding of the chancellor and affirmed the injunction.
In arriving at its decision, the court noted the constitution of
the International Union prohibited members from working with
non-union employees, that union officials had testified that it
was the policy of the I.B.E.W. to work only with union people
of their own craft, and that if the employer continued to have
non-union employees, that union officials had testified that it
union would have to give 60 days' notice. The court stated that
although the contract sought was legal on its face, the contract
by itself would not determine the objective of the picketing.
Other facts to be considered were (1) the circumstances of its
proposal, (2) the constitution of the International Union, and
(3) the testimony of union representatives concerning the followthrough of I.B.E.W. policy. These over-all considerations made
it apparent that a closed shop was the union's objective in
picketing.
The court reasoned that if the employer did not discharge nonunion employees, the union could always give 60 days' notice,
terminate the contract, and begin picketing under the pretext
of some claimed legitimate grievance; but basically the real purpose would be to force a closed shop. Therefore, if an injunction
were not granted, the employer would be subjected to endless
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picketing, which could only be terminated by a closed shop in
practice if not by contract. The court reiterated the principle
that peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose is protected by the
Federal Constitution and Arkansas law, but that peaceful picketing
for an unlawful objective is not protected as an exercise of the
right of free speech.
One judge dissented, saying that the evidence had shown that
the defendants would not promise to work more than 60 days,
which was their privilege, as there is no law requiring a promise
to work for a longer period. The judge apparently thought that
peaceful picketing should not be enjoined. However, he asserted
that if notice of cancellation were given, picketing could thereafter be enjoined if it had as an objective a closed shop agreement.
The critical question in this case was what the employees and
the union would do during the 60 days following a notice of
cancellation. The dissenting judge seemed to assume that the
workers would stay at their jobs for at least 60 days; whereas
the majority of the court apparently inferred that the contract
would not last even 60 days, with performance terminating soon
after notice of cancellation.
This decision is consistent with a recent United States Supreme
Court decision holding that picketing for a closed shop can
be enjoined by a state.' A similar holding was made in a 1951
case arising in Texas. 9
If the 60-day contract had been entered into, one may wonder
if the union would have cancelled the contract and called a strike
with the secret purpose of securing a closed shop. It would seem
that any court would have seen through such conduct. Furthermore,
if the union really had such a plan of conduct, a one-year contract
could have served its purpose equally as well.
It is suggested that the plan behind the offered contract was
along the following lines. The union was in a strong, entrenched
s Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U. S.
532 (1950).
9 Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 175 v. Walker, 236 S. W. 2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951) er. rel.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

position. Every employee was a union member. Under the 1947
act, however, the employer was able to hire non-union workers.
If he did so, he was aware that it would displease the union
employees and that 60 days hence his contract might be terminated
and production halted. But if he hired only union members, he
could count on continuous production for an indefinite period.
Actually, if the employer asserted his freedom and hired nonunion workers, the union would be legally helpless, as he would
be complying with law. Any attempt by the union thereafter to
force the employer to discharge the non-union employees would
be illegal and subject to legal action. It would, therefore, seem
that the psychological coercion and possibility of restricting the
contract to 60 days was the only threat present.
On close analysis, a basic reason for the decision would seem
to be a desire by the Arkansas Supreme Court to do its part in
achieving uniformity and stability in labor law and labor
relations. A means to this end is the continued promotion of
bargaining agreements for periods of at least one year. In support
of this thought, it need only be mentioned that the court was
influenced by an analogous situation in a case before the
National Labor Relations Board.1" There the federal board held
that union insistence on a 60-day cancellation clause amounted
to bad faith bargaining and was an unfair labor practice. The
court went on to state that the primary objective of collective
bargaining is to stabilize labor relations for reasonable periods
of time and that the union had been unwilling to bind itself for
more than 60 days, in the face of traditionally bargained-for
contracts of one-year duration. Viewing the current trend of
emphasis on stability and the securing of contracts of reasonable
and definite periods of time, the Arkansas Supreme Court probably
thought that a 60-day contract was odd and the labor relations
thereunder not sufficiently predictable. If the union's motives are
properly subordinated to the law, it can achieve satisfaction for
its legitimate claims, arising during conventional one-year periods.
10 Matter of Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 86 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1949).
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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-EMPLOYEE

PARTICIPATING IN LABOR DISPUTE

Arkansas. Reddick v. Scott" involved a proceeding for unemployment benefits by 12 employees. The situation originated when,
upon signs of union activity, the employer informed his employees
that if they wanted to organize a labor union, they would have
to seek employment elsewhere. This amounted to a lockout, and
a number of employees remained away from their jobs. The
employer then sent a letter to each of the absent employees and
assured them that their employee relationship had not been
terminated and that they could return to work. The employees
replied by letter requesting assurance that upon their return there
would be no discrimination on the basis of union activity. The
employer answered by mail, stating that there would be no such
discrimination, and the absent employees returned to their jobs.
A week later six or seven men were asked to work a Saturday
afternoon, but none of the employees showed up. As a result, five
of these employees were discharged. Incensed at the action, a
majority of the other employees called a strike and establishd a
picket line, taking the position that they would not return to work
unless the five were reinstated or unless all the others who failed
to work that afternoon were also discharged.
Twelve of the striking employees sought unemployment benefits
for the period commencing with the date of the strike. The
Arkansas Appeals Tribunal denied their claim on the ground that
unemployment was due to a labor dispute, but it overlooked a
provision of the Arkansas Employment Security Act authorizing
payment of benefits if the labor dispute was caused by a failure
or refusal of any employer to conform to terms of any agreement
or contract between employer and employee, or of any law of
Arkansas or of the United States pertaining to collective bargaining.' 2 The Board of Review, after noting the provision mentioned,
affirmed the lower tribunal's decision on the ground that there
had been no agreement between the employer and the employees.
IL----------Ark ....
12

ARK. STAT.

228 S. W. 2d 1008 (1950).

1947 ANN. § 81-1106(d).
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Upon appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the conclusions of the Appeals Tribunal and the Board of Review were
erroneous. The court said that the mere existence of a labor dispute
does not preclude the allowance of unemployment benefits and
that the exchange of letters constituted an agreement that there
would be no discrimination on account of union activity. However,
there had been no finding of fact by the administrative tribunals
as to (1) whether the labor dispute had been caused by the employer's failure to conform to his agreement or to law, (2) whether
or not the discharged employees owed their original idleness to
a labor dispute, and (3) whether such idle employees were available for work. The court, therefore, reversed the administrative
decision and remanded for proceedings in accordance with its
opinion.
The Arkansas statute seems express and clear. However, it
might be questioned as to whether the facts warranted application
of the statutory provision. It should be noted that only a part of
the employees remained away because of the lockout and that the
employer's letter assuring that there would be no discrimination
was submitted only to the absent employees. The facts of the case
were not complete, and it might well be that the great majority of
the employees were working during the lockout and did not participate in the correspondence. There was no indication that the
correspondence was participated in by some exclusive bargaining
agent for the employees. Furthermore, it was not clear whether
the five discharged men and the twelve seeking benefits were also
included in the number locked out. Although it is possible that an
agreement was made between the originally locked-out employees
and the employer, would such an agreement be impressed on the
other employees? It is true that an employer is not prohibited
from making separate and individual contracts with groups of
his employees, but the tendency today is to question agreements
other than a single exclusive contract between the representative of
the bargaining unit and the employer. Perhaps the union or a
majority of the employees ratified the agreement in the principal
case and thus made it binding as to all the employees. But the
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only evidence denoting ratification was the calling of a strike
by a majority of employees. Is this sufficient ratification?
From the standpoint of good labor relations the requirement
that an employer abide by his promise to his employees is sound.
The employer's assurances, although addressed to absent employees, probably became common knowledge among all employees in a matter of a few hours, and the workers would readily
interpret the assurances as applicable to all, just as any fairminded employer would intend. Apparently, the employees were
only commencing to organize and thus had no spokesman to
represent them all. In view of the circumstances, there would seem
to be an agreement and thus the technical aspect of statutory
application could be satisfied. It is to be noted that the National
Labor Relations Board held that the five men had not been
discriminated against because of union activity and that no
violation of the Taft-Hartley Act had occurred.'"
Texas has a statute pertaining to unemployment compensation
which disqualifies an employee from benefits if his stoppage of
work is due to a labor dispute at the place of last employment
and he has participated or is directly interested in the labor
dispute. 4 The wording is almost identical with that of the Arkansas
statute. However, the proviso allowing the employee participating
in the labor dispute to receive benefits where the dispute was
caused by the employer's failure to conform to his labor agree.
ment, is not included in the Texas statute. Inasmuch as the Texas
statute is clear and unambiguous and in view of the fact that
there are no reported cases interpreting the statute, it would seem
that a different holding would be made by a Texas court on the
facts made out in the principal case- Moreover, it would appear
that regardless of the cause of the labor dispute, the participating
or interested employee would be precluded from receiving unemployment compensation.
Alben Edward Carpens.
i3 L.
14

W. Scott, d.b.a. Scott Paper Box Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 535 (1949).
Txx. Rzv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon 1948), art. 5221b-3(d).

